Collective Action Problem
A Collective Action Problem arises when all individuals in a group would benefit from cooperation, but each individual has a rational incentive to free-ride on others' contributions. The result is systematic under-provision of public goods and over-exploitation of shared resources. Documented in Mancur Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965), it explains why unions struggle, environmental protections fail, and international agreements collapse — and how they succeed when they do.
Prisoner's Dilemma
The Prisoner's Dilemma is the foundational scenario in game theory illustrating how two rational actors can each have incentives to betray the other, even though mutual cooperation would produce better outcomes for both. Formulated by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher (1950) and named by Albert Tucker, it is the paradigm case for understanding why rational self-interest can produce collective irrationality, and why cooperation requires mechanisms beyond individual incentive.
Social Capital
Social Capital is the value embedded in social networks — the relationships, trust, reciprocity norms, and shared expectations that enable cooperation and collective action. Robert Putnam's foundational research showed that social capital is a major predictor of economic development, health outcomes, and institutional effectiveness. Pierre Bourdieu distinguished social capital from economic and cultural capital as a separate but equally real form of wealth.
Zero-Sum vs. Non-Zero-Sum Thinking
Zero-sum framing assumes one party's gain must come at another's expense — the pie is fixed. Non-zero-sum framing recognises that interactions can create value for all parties simultaneously — the pie can grow. Most real negotiations, business deals, and relationships are non-zero-sum, but people systematically default to zero-sum thinking, leaving significant value uncreated through zero-sum defensiveness in inherently cooperative situations.