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The Republic, read with AI

Plato · translated by Benjamin Jowett (3rd ed., 1888) · c. 375 BC

Plato's *Republic*, in Benjamin Jowett's translation, is the great dialogue in which Socrates and his companions search for the nature of justice and, in doing so, construct an ideal city and a model of the well-ordered soul. The work moves from a conversation about justice that is at first defined in conventional terms, as truth-telling, repaying debts, or doing good to friends, toward a far more demanding account. Thrasymachus's claim that justice is the interest of the stronger is refuted by an analogy with the arts, in which every craft serves the good of what it governs rather than the advantage of its practitioner. Glaucon and Adeimantus then press for proof that justice is good in itself, not merely for its rewards or reputation, and this challenge drives the rest of the book. Because justice is hard to see in a single individual, Socrates proposes to find it first in a city built in speech, and the ideal state, with its guardians, philosophers, and carefully regulated education, becomes the larger stage on which justice is displayed.

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Questions answered from the whole book

Each answer was written by MindMax after reading the full text, and every quotation was checked word for word against it.

How many times is the definition of justice revised across the books?

I'll trace the definitions of justice through the text, starting with the sections the map flags for this.The answer depends on how you count, so I'll give the sequence of proposed definitions as the text presents them and say where the count is contestable. Let me confirm the key passages in Book I and Book II before listing them.The count depends on what you treat as a distinct definition. Here is the sequence as the text presents it. I have read Book I and the Book IV passage directly, and I have checked the other steps through search excerpts rather than full sections, so treat those as provisional.

The sequence of proposed definitions

  1. Speaking the truth and paying one's debts (Cephalus, Book I). Socrates rejects this, noting exceptions: you should not return a weapon to a friend who has gone mad. But then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct definition of justice
  2. Giving each man what is proper to him, which Simonides called a "debt" (Book I). Socrates reads this as a refinement of the first definition, not a new one. Cfor he really meant to say that justice is the giving to each man what is proper to him, and this he termed a debt
  3. Doing good to friends and harm to enemies (Polemarchus, Book I). The Book I summary says Socrates tests and rejects this, arguing that the just man cannot harm anyone.
  4. Justice as the interest of the stronger (Thrasymachus, Book I). Socrates dismantles this over Book I and the start of Book II, and then in Book II Polemarchus and Cleitophon restate it in revised form. I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. And now why do you not praise me?
  5. Justice as "the having and doing what is a man's own" (Book IV). Socrates reaches this by analogy with the courts, which decide that no one may take what is not his own. Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man’s own, and belongs to him?
  6. Each part of the soul doing its own work (Book IV, applied to the individual). Socrates confirms in the soul what he found in the state, and the individual who lets each faculty do its own work is just. We must recollect that the individual in whom the several qualities of his nature do their own work will be just, and will do his own work?

Counting

  • If you count each distinct proposal, there are five attempts before the settled account (the truth-and-debts, Simonides' "debt," doing good to friends, the interest of the stronger, and the own-work definition), with the soul version as a sixth step.
  • If you count only the substantive revisions, where the view itself changes and not just its wording, the picture is narrower: the account moves from conventional morality (Book I), through the interest-of-the-stronger view (Thrasymachus), to the own-work definition (Book IV).

The text itself does not settle the number. Socrates admits at the end of Book I that he does not know what justice is, and the own-work definition in Book IV is the one he ends up affirming. I have not read Book II's Gyges and Glaucon material in full, so I would not rely on my count for the Book II and V passages without checking them.

Why must the young guardians not be told tales of Hades as a terrible place?

I'll read the passage in Book III where Socrates makes this argument.Let me read the full passage in Book III.The reason is courage. In Book III, Socrates argues that the guardians must be taught to be brave, and that bravery cannot coexist with a fear of death. He asks, "Can any man be courageous who has the fear of death in him?" and then, "can he be fearless of death... who believes the world below to be real and terrible?" His answer is "Impossible." So if the young come to believe that Hades is a real and dreadful place, they will not be fearless in battle, and they will not prefer death to defeat and slavery.

Socrates adds two further reasons:

  • Slavery is the greater evil. The guardians are "meant to be free, and who should fear slavery more than death." Tales that make death terrifying would work against the fear of slavery that should guide them.
  • Their nerves. Socrates grants that such horrible stories "may have a use of some kind," but warns "there is a danger that the nerves of our guardians may be rendered too excitable and effeminate by them."

For this reason he says the poets must be asked "not simply to revile but rather to commend the world below," and that the tales describing its terrors should be removed, even the most poetically admired ones. The stories are to be judged by what they do to the character of future warriors, not by their literary merit.

And can he be fearless of death, or will he choose death in battle rather than defeat and slavery, who believes the world below to be real and terrible?

the less are they meet for the ears of boys and men who are meant to be free, and who should fear slavery more than death

there is a danger that the nerves of our guardians may be rendered too excitable and effeminate by them

How does the tyrannical man come into being out of the democratic one?

I'll read the relevant section of Book IX to answer this from the text.In Book IX, Socrates explains that the tyrannical man is generated out of the democratic one through a generational process driven by unchecked desire. The democratic man is first described as having been raised by a miserly father who encouraged the saving appetites and discouraged the unnecessary ones. He then fell into the company of more refined, licentious people and, reacting against his father's meanness, swung to the opposite extreme. Being better than his corruptors, he halted midway and lived in "moderate indulgence in various pleasures." After this manner the democrat was generated out of the oligarch?

The decisive step comes with his son. The son is "drawn into a perfectly lawless life, which by his seducers is termed perfect liberty," while his father and friends back his moderate desires and the opposite party backs the others. Those seducers then "implant in him a master passion, to be lord over his idle and spendthrift lusts," which Socrates calls "a sort of monstrous winged drone." implant in him a master passion, to be lord over his idle and spendthrift lusts

That master passion, Love (Eros), then rules the soul. Once it has the upper hand, the other lusts crowd in, "nourishing to the utmost the sting of desire," and Madness becomes the captain of his guard. The young man casts out whatever good opinions and shame remain, "purged away temperance and brought in madness to the full." The tyrannical man is made up of lusts and appetites. Love, drink, madness are but different forms of tyranny. Socrates concludes that the tyrannical man "comes into being when, either under the influence of nature, or habit, or both, he becomes drunken, lustful, passionate."

The rest of the passage traces what follows. Desires multiply, his property is spent, and he falls into debt. He then robs and beats his parents, turns to theft, temple robbery, and violence, and gathers a band of followers. The dreams he once had only in sleep become his waking conduct. Finally, if enough of this criminal class gather in the city, they set up "the one who has most of the tyrant in his own soul" as tyrant. He will rob his father and mother.

In short, the democratic man becomes tyrannical when his moderate, self-regulated pleasures are overthrown by a single dominant erotic passion, which then drives every other appetite and removes the restraints of reason and shame.

Why does Plato insist that mathematics must be studied in relation to the idea of good?

I'll look at the Republic's own text on mathematics and the good before answering.Let me read the key passages in full before relying on them.I searched the Republic and read the key passages. The text gives a clear reason for mathematics being studied in relation to the good, though the reasoning is spread over several places.

The core argument: mathematics points the soul toward being. In Book VII, Socrates says arithmetic is a study that "leads naturally to reflection, but never to have been rightly used; for the true use of it is simply to draw the soul towards being." for the true use of it is simply to draw the soul towards being The idea is that the objects of sense invite no thought (a finger is a finger whether it looks thick or thin), while numbers prompt the mind to ask what they actually are. That questioning is the first step out of the visible world.

Geometry and astronomy carry this further. Geometry "will draw the soul towards truth, and create the spirit of philosophy." Then, my noble friend, geometry will draw the soul towards truth, and create the spirit of philosophy Astronomy likewise "compels the soul to look upwards and leads us from this world to another." For every one, as I think, must see that astronomy compels the soul to look upwards and leads us from this world to another.

Why the good is the goal. The sciences are a graded ascent, and their value lies in where they lead. Mathematics is valuable because it turns the mind toward intelligible being, and the highest object of that ascent is the idea of the good. Jowett's introduction makes this explicit for harmonics: "Platonic idea of harmony, which must be studied in a purely abstract way, first by the method of problems, and secondly as a part of universal knowledge in relation to the idea of good." Platonic idea of harmony, which must be studied in a purely abstract way, first by the method of problems, and secondly as a part of universal knowledge in relation to the idea of good.

A warning against the wrong use. Plato insists that studying mathematics for practical ends misses its purpose. Socrates says astronomers who treat it as observation of the stars "make us look downwards and not upwards." I should rather say that those who elevate astronomy into philosophy appear to me to make us look downwards and not upwards. Mathematics must be studied abstractly, as a route to what is intelligible, not as a craft of measurement.

So the answer is this: mathematics is not valuable in itself as a body of technical skill. It trains the soul to move from sensible appearances toward pure intelligible objects, and the idea of the good is the end of that movement, the source of what is known and of the being of what is known. Studying mathematics apart from that end would leave the student looking at the sensible world.

One caveat: Jowett's introduction notes that Plato himself leaves some of this unexplained, including exactly how the dialectic that follows the mathematical sciences reaches the good. The passages above establish the direction of the argument, but the full mechanism is developed in the later discussion of dialectic, which I have not read in detail here.

What natural gifts must the ideal ruler possess, according to the text?

I'll look for the passage in Book VI and Book VII where Socrates discusses the natural gifts of the ruler-philosopher.Let me read the key passage in Book VI to confirm the context before answering.The text lists these natural gifts for the philosopher-ruler, drawn from the passage in Book VI (the section on the philosophic nature):

  • A love of learning and truth. The true lover of learning must "from his earliest youth, as far as in him lies, desire all truth." The true lover of learning then must from his earliest youth, as far as in him lies, desire all truth
  • Temperance and freedom from covetousness. His desires are drawn toward knowledge, so he is "temperate and the reverse of covetous or mean." He will be absorbed in the pleasures of the soul, and therefore temperate and the reverse of covetous or mean
  • Magnanimity and freedom from meanness. He has "magnificence of mind" and is "the spectator of all time and all existence," so he does not think much of human life or fear death. In the magnificence of his contemplations he will not think much of human life
  • A gentle, harmonious, sociable character. He is not unjust, hard, a boaster, or a coward, and is "of a gentle, sociable, harmonious nature." He will be of a gentle, sociable, harmonious nature; a lover of learning, having a good memory
  • A good memory. Socrates insists that "a soul which forgets cannot be ranked among genuine philosophic natures." we must insist that the philosopher should have a good memory
  • Quickness in learning and a well-proportioned mind. The philosopher should be "quick to learn" and have "a naturally well-proportioned and gracious mind, which will move spontaneously towards the true being of everything." Then, besides other qualities, we must try to find a naturally well-proportioned and gracious mind

Later, in Book VII, Socrates summarizes the gifts as "quickness and memory and courage and magnificence." and remember what we were saying of him, that he was to have quickness and memory and courage and magnificence

Note that the text frames these as the qualities of the *philosophic* nature in general, which the ruler must have, rather than as a separate list for rulers alone. Socrates also says such gifts are rare, since quick intelligence and high spirit seldom come together with a settled character.

Is pleasure merely the cessation of pain, according to the argument here?

The prefetched leads point to Book IX, so I'll read that passage before answering.The read worked on the pinned document, so the restriction is not blocking this. Let me try again with the document-specific tool.No, not according to the argument in Book IX. Socrates argues that pleasure is not merely the cessation of pain, though he grants that many people take it to be so.

The argument runs as follows. Socrates asks whether pleasure is opposed to pain, and then whether there is a neutral state between them. He takes up the idea that the rest from pain is itself the greatest pleasure. In the passage that opens the reply, he says that "All pleasures are not merely cessations of pains, or pains of pleasures" B All pleasures are not merely cessations of pains, or pains of pleasures; e.g. the pleasures of smell are not.. His example is the pleasures of smell, which have no antecedent pain. He suggests that once we look at pleasures of that kind, we will no longer assume that pleasure is only the cessation of pain.

He then concludes that we should not be led to believe "that pure pleasure is the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure" C Let us not, then, be induced to believe that pure pleasure is the cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure..

The argument's shape matters here. Socrates does not deny that some pleasures are relief from pain. He denies that all pleasure is of that kind. Pure pleasures, such as the smell example, are positive in a way that rest from pain is not. This distinction supports his ranking of lives later in the book, since the philosopher's life is judged to contain the purest pleasures.

How does the Republic's argument divide into its natural sections?

I'll work from the document's section map, which is a coarse-grain question about structure, so the map is enough for the overall division. I'll check the book boundaries quickly to make the outline accurate.The Introduction's own sketch of the work matters here, so I'll read the passage that describes the five natural divisions.The Introduction's own analysis gives the natural division. Here is how it falls.

The Republic divides into five natural sections, as the Introduction and Analysis lays them out:

  1. Book I, and the first half of Book II down to the introductory paragraph ("I had always admired the genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus"). This part refutes the popular and sophistical notions of justice and ends without a definite result. It then restates the question: what is justice, stripped of appearances? The natural divisions are five in number;—(1) Book I and the first half of Book II down to the paragraph beginning, ‘I had always admired the genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus,’ which is introductory
  1. The rest of Book II, and Books III and IV. These are mainly occupied with constructing the first State and its first education. The second division (2) includes the remainder of the second and the whole of the third and fourth books, which are mainly occupied with the construction of the first State and the first education.
  1. Books V, VI and VII (the third division, which the text is cut off before it describes in full). This is where the philosopher-rulers, the common life of the guardians, and the Idea of the Good come in, though I have not read this passage back, so I will not characterise it further.
  1. Books VIII and IX, which trace the decline of the regimes from the perfect State through to tyranny and rank the lives of the souls shaped by each.
  1. Book X, which returns to the critique of imitative poetry and closes with the myth of Er on the soul's immortality and the reward of the just.

The Introduction also observes that the book divisions are probably later than Plato's age, so the five-part scheme is the more reliable guide to the work's shape. The same Introduction argues that the search for justice and the construction of the ideal State are not separate projects: justice is the order of the State, and the State is justice embodied in human society.

Parts 3 through 5 are described from the map's summaries and the Introduction's preview rather than from the passages themselves. If you want exact wording for the fifth division or the end of the third, I can read those sections.

What is Thrasymachus's definition of justice, and why does Socrates question it?

I'll read the relevant section of Book I to ground this in the text.I need the surrounding Book I passage to see Socrates's exact argument. Let me read the section where the exchange happens.Thrasymachus's definition appears in Book I, and Socrates's objection is built from the analogy with the arts. Here is the account from the text.

Thrasymachus's definition. He puts it bluntly: "I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger" I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the interest of the stronger. And now why do you not praise me?. He explains that "the rulers make laws for their own interests" Thrasymachus is indignant at the illustration, and in pompous words, apparently intended to restore dignity to the argument, he explains his meaning to be that the rulers make laws. In his own closing summary, justice is "another's good; that is to say, the interest of the ruler and stronger, and the loss of the subject and servant," while injustice on a large scale, such as tyranny, is the real advantage justice is the interest of the stronger, whereas injustice is a man’s own profit and interest.

Socrates's objections. Socrates pursues the definition in several steps:

  1. The ruler's error. If the stronger or ruler makes a mistake, then his "interest" is not really his interest, so the definition would have justice mean obeying something harmful to the ruler. Thrasymachus's follower Cleitophon tries to rescue it by changing the wording to what the stronger *thinks* is his interest, but this just shifts the problem, and Thrasymachus ends up conceding that the stronger may command the weaker to do what is not in the stronger's own interest But suppose, says Socrates, that the ruler or stronger makes a mistake—then the interest of the stronger is not his interest..
  1. The analogy with the arts. Socrates asks whether the physician, in the strict sense, is a healer of the sick or a maker of money, and whether the pilot is a captain of sailors or a mere sailor. Each art, he argues, considers the interest of its subject, not of itself, so "no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of the stronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and weaker" Then, I said, no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of the stronger or superior, but only the interest of the Dsubject and weaker?. Since rule in the strict sense serves the ruled, a true ruler does not seek his own advantage.
  1. Thrasymachus's retreat. After this, Thrasymachus stops engaging and turns to insults, comparing Socrates to someone who has never had a nurse, then argues that injustice pays better than justice. Socrates, who is not persuaded, presses him to be consistent rather than change his position openly.

So Socrates questions the definition because it is internally unstable: it either makes justice harmful to the rulers who follow it, or it requires a rewording that abandons "the stronger's interest" as the real content. The analogy with the arts then shows that rulers, in the strict sense, serve their subjects, which undermines Thrasymachus's claim that justice is the advantage of the powerful. Note that this is the opening of the argument in Book I; the wider debate, carried on by Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book II, is about whether justice is good in itself, which is what leads Socrates to build the city in speech.

Where in the State does courage reside, and what is it?

I'll read the section of Book IV that the prefetched leads point to.In the State, courage resides in the soldier class, and it is the quality of preserving right opinion about what is to be feared and what is not.

Where it resides. Socrates says that whenever anyone calls a state courageous or cowardly, they are thinking of the part that "fights and goes out to war on the State's behalf." The other citizens may be brave or timid, but "their courage or cowardice will not... have the effect of making the city either the one or the other."The courage which makes the city courageous is found chiefly in the soldier. Why, I said, every one who calls any State courageous or cowardly, will be thinking of the part which fights and goes out to war on the State’s behalf.

What it is. Courage is "the quality which preserves right opinion about things to be feared and not to be feared." Socrates clarifies that this is a kind of "salvation" of the opinion that the law implants through education, and that it holds "under all circumstances," whether in pleasure or pain, or under the influence of desire or fear.I mean that courage is a kind of salvation.

To illustrate, Socrates compares the soldier's training to dyeing wool: if the white ground is carefully prepared, the purple takes fast and resists washing, but if it is not, the colour looks washed-out. Likewise, the soldiers must "take the dye of the laws," so that their opinion about dangers is fixed by nurture and training and cannot be washed away by pleasure, sorrow, fear, or desire.Our soldiers must take the dye of the laws.

Socrates ends by calling this "universal saving power of true opinion in conformity with law about real and false dangers" courage. He explicitly excludes "mere uninstructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a slave," which is not the courage he means.And this sort of universal saving power of true opinion in conformity with law about real and false dangers I call and maintain to be courage, unless you disagree.

Chapter by chapter

  1. 开头部分

    This passage is not a chapter of Plato's argument but the front matter of a Project Gutenberg edition of Jowett's translation of *The Republic*: title page, publication details (eBook #55201, July 26, 2017, updated April 1, 2026), credits, a transcriber's note on which editions were used (chiefly the 1888 third edition, with Stephanus numbering from a 1908 two-volume version), and a table of contents. It does not reach the dialogue itself, so the discussion of justice, the ideal city, the philosopher-kings, or the cave is absent. Page numbers appear in red and Stephanus numbers in the margin; sidenotes run down the left. A reader seeking Socrates's arguments will find none here.

  2. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO … PREFACE.

    This Preface, which opens the third edition of Jowett's translation of Plato's Republic, does not argue a philosophical question but explains the state of the published text. It records that the editor thanks his secretary Matthew Knight, Frank Fletcher and J. W. MacKail for their help with accuracy, credits Knight with the index, and notes that revisions affect roughly a third of the introduction and text. It then describes an arrangement for owners of the 1881 separate edition: on returning a perfect copy to a Clarendon Press agent, they may buy the new edition at half price. The Preface closes by announcing a planned revised edition of the remaining Dialogues within a year. It leaves the translation, the introduction's analysis, and the Republic's content to the rest of the volume.

  3. INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.(第 1/12 部分)

    This opening section of Plato's Republic (Introduction and Analysis, part 1 of 12) situates the work as the greatest of Plato's dialogues, a centre around which the others are grouped, and the first philosophical treatment of method, education and ideal politics. It then sketches the dialogue's argument: the search for justice, first hinted at by the aged Cephalus, tested against proverbial morality through Socrates and Polemarchus, caricatured by Thrasymachus, and reduced to an abstraction by Glaucon and Adeimantus before being sought in an ideal State. It describes the five natural divisions of the work, the characters and their dramatic roles, and the Socratic method. Book I is analysed in detail, ending with Thrasymachus's claim that justice is the interest of the stronger. The later books, the construction of the ideal State, and the critique of poetry and the afterlife are only previewed here.

  4. INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.(第 2/12 部分)

    This section of the Republic's introduction and analysis covers Book I's closing exchanges with Thrasymachus and the opening of Book II, where Glaucon and Adeimantus press Socrates to prove that justice is good in itself, apart from its rewards and reputation. It traces how Socrates turns Thrasymachus's claim that justice is the interest of the stronger against him, using the analogy of the arts: every art serves the good of what it governs, not the artist's advantage, and the just man is the skilled practitioner who does not seek excess. It concludes that justice and happiness cannot be separated, though the argument is partly indirect. Book II then sets out Glaucon's challenge, the ring of Gyges and the ideal contrast between the just and unjust man, and Adeimantus's critique of conventional morality and the poets. The section stops before Socrates begins constructing the imaginary State, and it leaves the later treatment of education, poetry and theology to other parts of the work.

  5. INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.(第 3/12 部分)

    This section of the Republic (Book III, with the opening of Book IV) lays out how the guardians of Plato's ideal city should be educated, beginning with the purging of poetry and religious stories. Socrates argues that the myths of gods and heroes must be censored: the gods must never be shown as deceitful, quarrelsome or grieving, and fear of death and of Hades must be removed so that soldiers can be brave. Homeric figures such as Achilles and Priam are judged unfit models. The discussion then turns to style and narrative modes, concluding that the guardians should imitate only what is good and should not play many parts. Music is pared down to the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies, and gymnastic and diet are kept simple, with medicine and law reserved for real need. The section ends with the "noble lie" of the earthborn citizens and the division of gold, silver, brass and iron natures, and with the warning that guardians must own no private property. Book IV then asks whether the guardians are unhappy, answering that the city's aim is the good of the whole rather than their happiness.

  6. INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.(第 4/12 部分)

    This section of the introduction and analysis to Plato's Republic, Book IV, takes up the question of where justice is to be found once wisdom, courage, and temperance have been identified in the ideal state. Socrates proposes a method of residues: wisdom resides in the guardians, courage in the soldiers, and temperance as a harmony running through all classes, so justice must be the remaining principle, namely each class doing its own business. The argument then turns to the individual, where the soul is shown to have three parts (reason, passion or spirit, and appetite) by the principle that contradictory effects cannot spring from one faculty, illustrated by thirst and by the story of Leontius. The conclusion is that the virtues of state and individual coincide, and the editor's commentary links this to Plato's wider metaphysics of ideas, while noting the unfinished "longer way" the dialogue leaves to later books.

  7. INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.(第 5/12 部分)

    This section is the Introduction and Analysis to Republic Books V and VI, opening with the fifth book's new beginning, in which community of property and family are first maintained and the transition is made to the kingdom of philosophers. It takes up the communistic plan, its unresolved defects (the prohibited degrees, the lottery manipulation, the treatment of the lower classes), and the image of the three waves; it then moves to the figment of contingent matter, the first appearance of that idea in the history of philosophy. The analysis of Book VI begins with the philosopher's virtues, Adeimantus's objection that philosophers prove useless or corrupt, Socrates's parable of the ship's captain, and the corruption of rare natures by public opinion. It closes on the higher, longer method of dialectic, the sun, line and cave analogies, and the idea of good, which the commentary treats as a mere abstraction. Later dialogues and the seventh book's treatment of education are left to other parts.

  8. INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.(第 6/12 部分)

    This section of the introduction and analysis to Plato's Republic covers the Allegory of the Cave (Book VII, 514–521) and the curriculum that leads the mind toward the idea of good. It explains the cave's parable of prisoners who see only shadows, the painful ascent to sunlight, and the return of the enlightened philosopher to govern. It then sets out the stages of education: arithmetic, plane and solid geometry, astronomy and harmonics, and finally dialectic, which alone reaches the first principle. The analysis reads the parable politically and philosophically, and discusses the dangers of premature or mistaken philosophical training. It ends with the shift to Book VIII and the decline of the perfect State into timocracy. The section does not treat the full theory of the forms or the later discussion of the Good in the Philebus in any depth.

  9. INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.(第 7/12 部分)

    This section of the Introduction and Analysis to *The Republic* (Books VIII and IX) traces how the ideal state decays and how the individual souls shaped by each regime follow it. It opens with the "number" of human generation, a riddle the Muses set, whose neglect brings division and the decline of rule. It then moves through timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and tyranny, each derived from the one before by excess of wealth or freedom, and matches each state with a corresponding character: the ambitious lover of honour, the miser, the democratic man given to every passing pleasure, and finally the tyrannical man ruled by a single monstrous appetite. The conclusion is that tyranny is the worst form of rule and the tyrant the most wretched of men, governed by lawless desire. Terms such as "drones," "necessary and unnecessary pleasures," and the protector who becomes a tyrant recur. Problems of Plato's wider metaphysics and the philosophy of love are left to other parts of the book.

  10. INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.(第 8/12 部分)

    This section of the Republic's analysis, covering the close of Book IX and all of Book X, takes up the question of whether the just man is truly happier than the unjust, and whether poetry, especially Homer and the tragedians, should have a place in the ideal State. It runs through the tripartite soul and the three kinds of pleasure, the ranking of the king, oligarch and tyrant by the number 729, and then the critique of imitation: the painter and poet are "thrice removed" from the truth and appeal to the irrational part of the soul. The argument moves to the immortality of the soul, arguing that only internal corruption, not bodily evil, can destroy it. It concludes with the myth of Er, in which souls choose their future lives and the just are rewarded after death. Related matters such as the education of the guardians are left to earlier books.

  11. INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.(第 9/12 部分)

    This section of the introduction to Plato's Republic opens with Book X's assault on the poets, which resumes an earlier thread: having analysed the soul, Socrates judges poetry and the imitative arts to be remote from truth, appealing to the emotions and to tyrants. The argument then turns to the immortality of the soul, supported by the myth of Er and its vision of the afterlife, where souls choose new lives and drink from the river of Forgetfulness. Plato's hostility to poets is traced to the decline of Athenian drama, to Euripides as a sophist of tragedy, and to a contrast between philosophy and poetry, between universals and particulars of sense. The discussion concludes that art is not wholly without value, though it must be judged against a higher standard of truth. The section does not reach the Spartan and Pythagorean sources of the ideal state or the paradoxes of communism, which are taken up in the following part.

  12. INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.(第 10/12 部分)

    This section of the Introduction and Analysis takes up Plato's proposals for community of property and, more controversially, community of wives and children, and asks whether the received notions of property and the family are the best possible. It opens by contrasting the ancient and modern sacredness of property with the earlier practice of common land, and argues that Plato's views may be an exaggeration of the Spartan commonwealth rather than a wholly alien idea. The discussion then moves to women's equality with men, set against the Athenian subordination of women, and to the marriage arrangements aimed at improving the race, which the author rejects on grounds of human feeling, the moral unity of body and mind, and the lessons of Sparta. The section concludes that Plato's error lies in forgetting what distinguishes man from the animals, and it closes with a note on the philosopher-king and the abstract study of the idea of good. Related matters of education and the ideal state's institutions are treated elsewhere in the book.

  13. INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.(第 11/12 部分)

    This section of the introduction to Plato's Republic covers the middle and late parts of the Introduction and Analysis, moving through the philosophy of ideas, the place of the philosopher-statesman, the relation between state and individual, and Plato's theory of education. It opens with the discovery of great metaphysical conceptions such as the idea of good and argues that their value is often misjudged by their discoverers and by posterity. It then examines whether God stands above or below the idea of good, concluding that the two may be different modes of conceiving the same perfection. Plato's education is traced from music and gymnastic to mathematics and dialectic, and its continuation through later life is set against the modern world's neglect of self-education. The section ends by contrasting the Greek sense of fixed, legislated order with modern ideas of progress. Discussion of the Statesman and Laws is deferred to their own introductions.

  14. INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.(第 12/12 部分)

    This final portion of the Introduction and Analysis compares Plato's Republic with his Laws and with later ideal-state writings. It argues that the Laws, though inferior in dramatic power and poetic form, contain more of the mature knowledge of life, and it sets out Aristotle's and Plato's own accounts of how the two works relate. It then traces the Republic's influence through Cicero's De Republica, Augustine's City of God, Dante's De Monarchia, More's Utopia, Bacon's New Atlantis and Campanella's City of the Sun, closing with reflections on ideals as guides to human conduct. The discussion ends with the Christian ideal of the Divine man, which Plato is said to have glimpsed.

  15. BOOK I(第 1/2 部分)

    This section opens Book I of the Republic with Socrates and Glaucon detained by Polemarchus on their way home from the Piraeus, and moves into the house of Cephalus, where the old man reflects on old age and the consolations of wealth. It then turns to the definition of justice: first as truth-telling and repaying debts, as proposed by Simonides, then as doing good to friends and harm to enemies, which Socrates tests and rejects, arguing that the just man cannot harm anyone and that justice is not a kind of theft. The discussion ends with Thrasymachus bursting in to declare that justice is "the interest of the stronger," a definition Socrates begins to dismantle by showing that rulers may err about their own interest. The section stops before Socrates fully refutes Thrasymachus and does not yet offer his own positive account of justice; those developments, and the later dialogue on the ideal state, lie beyond this part.

  16. BOOK I(第 2/2 部分)

    This section picks up Socrates' exchange with Thrasymachus, who claims that justice is the interest of the stronger and that injustice, practised on a large scale, is more profitable than justice. Socrates argues by analogy with the arts: the physician, pilot and shepherd, considered strictly as rulers, attend to the good of their subjects rather than their own, so no ruler qualifies as one who seeks the interest of the stronger. The argument then turns to why good men accept office, namely fear of being ruled by someone worse, and to whether the unjust can act together. It concludes that justice is wisdom and virtue, injustice ignorance and vice, and that the just soul lives well and is happy. Socrates ends by admitting he knows not what justice is. The later books take up the nature of justice in the state and soul.

  17. BOOK II.(第 1/2 部分)

    This section of Book II opens with Glaucon pressing Socrates to show, not merely assert, that justice is better than injustice, and sets out the threefold division of goods: those desired for their own sake, those desired for their results, and those endured only for reward. Socrates places justice in the highest class. Glaucon then reports the common account of justice as a compromise between doing and suffering injustice, and tests it with the story of Gyges' ring, which he uses to argue that men are just only out of necessity. Adeimantus follows, showing that parents, poets and prophets praise justice only for its reputation and rewards, and he asks for an account of what justice does to the soul. Socrates agrees to proceed by constructing a State in speech, first to see justice on a larger scale, and the section ends as the city's basic economy, the division of labour, and the need for trade are being laid out. Questions of the soul's inner order are left to later argument.

  18. BOOK II.(第 2/2 部分)

    This section of Book II, the second half, follows Socrates and Glaucon as they build the ideal city outward from its simple origins into a more elaborate state. It begins with the growth of trade, retail dealers, merchants, sailors and hirelings, and then sketches a "luxurious" city whose wants demand more craftsmen, servants, physicians and territory, which in turn leads to war. Socrates concludes that the guardians must combine a gentle nature with spirit, and that philosophy is the mark of such a guardian, which he illustrates with the dog's way of distinguishing friend from enemy. The passage ends by setting out how the young are to be educated, beginning with music and a censorship of the poets' tales, and it closes by insisting that God is good, unchanging and never deceptive. The discussion of justice and injustice is taken up later, and the detailed education of the guardians belongs to the following book.

  19. BOOK III.(第 1/2 部分)

    This section of Book III of Plato's Republic, in the Socrates–Adeimantus dialogue, takes up how the young guardians should be taught the content of myth and poetry. It argues that tales depicting the world below as terrible, gods laughing or quarrelling, lamenting heroes such as Achilles and Priam, and divine or heroic wickedness must be censored, because they encourage fear of death, excessive emotion, and moral laxity. Truthfulness is required of rulers and the young, and temperance is tied to obedience and self-control. The discussion then moves from the matter of poetry to its manner, distinguishing pure narration, pure imitation, and the mixed style exemplified by Homer, and concluding that only imitation of virtue should be admitted, with the pantomimic performer sent away. It ends by turning to harmony and rhythm, retaining only the Dorian and Phrygian modes and the lyre and harp. The passage stops before the full account of rhythm, which is deferred to Damon, and leaves the question of justice and whether bad men prosper to later argument.

  20. BOOK III.(第 2/2 部分)

    This section of Book III of *The Republic* covers the second half of Socrates' account of early education. It argues that music and gymnastic work together on the soul: rhythm and harmony enter the inner self and make a well-educated person graceful and good, while the ill-educated become ungraceful, and a true musician learns to recognise the forms of virtue and vice wherever they appear. Socrates then turns to gymnastic, condemning the heavy diet and sleepy regimen of ordinary athletes, the luxuries of Syracuse and Corinth, and the overgrown courts and medicine of a corrupt city, which he traces to Herodicus's invention of lingering valetudinarian care. The section ends by fixing the choice of rulers: the best guardians are tested from youth through toils, fears and pleasures, and a "Phoenician" tale of earth-born citizens of mixed metals is introduced, followed by the rules of the warriors' camp, where guardians hold no private property. The later selection of the philosopher-kings is left to Book IV.

  21. BOOK IV.(第 1/2 部分)

    This section opens with Adeimantus's objection that Socrates's guardians are miserable, lacking land, houses, gold and silver, and it works through a reply: the State should be judged as a whole, not by the happiness of one class. Socrates argues that wealth and poverty both corrupt the arts, that the city must remain one and self-sufficient, and that education and nurture, especially music and gymnastic kept unchanged, form the foundation of order. The section then turns to the four virtues, locating wisdom in the guardians, courage in the soldiers who keep right opinion about what is to be feared, and temperance as harmony across all classes. It ends with the claim that justice is the principle of each person doing his own work, and it leaves religion and detailed legislation to Delphi and to the citizens themselves.

  22. BOOK IV.(第 2/2 部分)

    This section of Book IV of Plato's *Republic* takes up the question of whether justice in the individual soul mirrors justice in the State, after the four civic virtues have been identified. Socrates argues that justice is the principle of each part doing its own work and not meddling with another's, a rule that holds for classes in the State as for faculties in the person. To test whether the soul has parallel parts, he sets out the principle of contradiction, that the same thing cannot act or be acted upon in contrary ways at once in the same part. Using examples of thirst, the archer's bow, and Leontius and the corpses, he separates reason, appetite, and spirit (passion), and concludes that the soul has three principles matching the State's three classes. The section ends by noting that justice in the individual is health and order, injustice disease, and that the earlier question of whether the just or unjust man is happier now seems ridiculous. It carries into Book V, where the five forms of State and soul are introduced. Detailed treatment of the ideal city's education and rulers is left to earlier books.

  23. BOOK V.(第 1/2 部分)

    This section of Book V opens with Adeimantus demanding that Socrates explain the community of women and children among the guardians, which he had deferred. Socrates first argues that women should share the same nurture, education, music, gymnastic and military training as men, since the difference of sex matters only for bearing and suckling children. He then argues for the wider unity of the State: the greatest good is unity and the greatest evil discord, and a community of wives and children produces a common sense of "mine" and "not mine," so that the guardians feel one another's joys and sorrows as their own. The passage stops before the question of whether such a scheme is practicable is fully resolved, and it does not yet treat the rulers' breeding arrangements in detail beyond the outline given here.

  24. BOOK V.(第 2/2 部分)

    This section of Book V, the second half of the discussion, takes up how the guardians of the ideal city should live and fight. It argues that the guardians, sharing women, children and property in common, will be free of the private quarrels and meannesses that plague ordinary households, and that their life is happier than that of Olympic victors. It then sets out rules for war: children accompany parents on campaign to learn their duties, cowards are demoted, honours go to the brave, Hellenes must not enslave or despoil fellow Hellenes, and internal strife is distinguished from war against barbarians. The section closes by introducing the claim that cities will not cease from evil until philosophers rule, and explains who counts as a philosopher: a lover of the whole of wisdom, who grasps the unchanging ideal of beauty and justice rather than merely their many changing instances. The fuller defence of this claim continues beyond this excerpt.

  25. BOOK VI.(第 1/2 部分)

    This section of Book VI opens with Socrates and Glaucon weighing who should rule the State, and argues that the true philosopher, as a lover of eternal and unchanging truth, is the proper guardian because he alone can see the pattern of justice and goodness. It then sketches the philosophical nature, marked by truthfulness, temperance, magnanimity, good memory and a harmonious disposition, and Adeimantus objects that philosophers are in practice useless or corrupt. Socrates answers with the parable of the ship, in which a noble but dull captain is mutinied against by quarrelling sailors who see the true pilot as a star-gazer. He explains that the fault lies with those who refuse to be governed by the wise, and then traces why promising natures are so often ruined: their own virtues distract them, wealth and rank mislead them, and public opinion and flattery corrupt them, leaving philosophy neglected and dishonoured. The passage ends by asking which existing State could suit philosophy, and it leaves the answer and the method of training philosophers to the continuation of the book.

  26. BOOK VI.(第 2/2 部分)

    This section of Book VI of the Republic takes up why philosophy is held in contempt and what the perfect ruler must know. Socrates blames the poor reputation of philosophy on pretenders who attack persons rather than study true being, and argues that the philosopher-ruler must combine rare gifts of quick intelligence and steady temperament, be tested in many kinds of knowledge, and above all grasp the idea of good, which he compares to the sun as the source of light and sight. The argument ends by dividing the visible and intelligible worlds into four sections, matched to four faculties of the soul: reason, understanding, faith, and perception of shadows. Key terms include the idea of good, dialectic, hypotheses, images, and the child of the good. The passage picks up from the discussion of education and the rulers, and it leaves the detailed curriculum of the guardians' training to later passages.

  27. BOOK VII.(第 1/2 部分)

    This section opens with Plato's allegory of the cave: prisoners chained from childhood see only shadows on a wall, and the philosopher is the one released, who climbs toward the sun, which stands for the idea of good. Socrates argues that the soul must be turned from becoming toward being, and that education must redirect the eye of the soul rather than implant sight. He then surveys the propaedeutic sciences: arithmetic, valued for drawing thought toward pure number, then plane geometry, and an early turn toward astronomy, with a correction of the order of study to take solids before astronomy. The passage ends mid-argument, with the sequence of sciences still being set out, so the full treatment of astronomy and dialectic continues beyond this excerpt.

  28. BOOK VII.(第 2/2 部分)

    This section of Book VII continues Socrates' account of the education of the future philosopher-rulers, moving from solid geometry and astronomy through harmonics to the culminating study of dialectic. It argues that astronomy should be pursued as an abstract science of true motions rather than by gazing at the visible heavens, and that the Pythagorean approach to harmony is likewise incomplete unless it reaches the rational principles of number. Dialectic is then presented as the coping-stone of all the sciences, the only method that proceeds by reason alone to the first principle, the idea of good, and it is distinguished from eristic, the contentious argument that corrupts the young. The passage sets out the graded divisions of intellect and opinion, the selection of naturally gifted students, and an age schedule running from childhood gymnastics to a fifty-year-old's mature service. It closes by summarizing the ideal State and its governors, male and female, and leaves the detailed mechanics of political office and the cave allegory's earlier content to the preceding and following passages.

  29. BOOK VIII.(第 1/2 部分)

    This section of Book VIII opens with Socrates recapitulating the perfect State, then turns to how political constitutions decay. It presents the theory that every government is an unstable union that eventually splits, the way the ruling class of the ideal city will fall into discord through a faulty breeding number, and traces the resulting shift from aristocracy to timocracy, the rule of honour that Sparta and Crete exemplify. The discussion then sketches the timocratic character, a contentious and ambitious man whose love of money grows as his father's virtue is neglected, and moves on to oligarchy, where property qualifications exclude the poor and the state splits into two hostile cities of rich and poor. Its drones, the spendthrift ruined men who turn to crime, and the miserly oligarchic man who shrinks from public contests are analysed in detail. The passage ends as democracy emerges from indebtedness and extravagance, with the pauper class plotting revolution. The later stages (democracy's character and tyranny) are left to the remainder of the book.

  30. BOOK VIII.(第 2/2 部分)

    This section of Book VIII, the second half of the chapter, traces how democracy degenerates into tyranny. It opens with the origin of democracy after the poor overthrow the rich, then portrays the democratic character as a motley, freedom-loving man who indulges every appetite in turn. Its argument moves from the oligarchic young man, whose unnecessary desires are fed by drones and rebellious allies, to the democratic man, and finally to the protector who, given a bodyguard, becomes a tyrant. Key terms include necessary and unnecessary desires, drones, the wealthy class and the people. The section concludes that excessive liberty naturally passes into the harshest slavery, and that the tyrant purges the good and rules by mercenaries. It ends the discussion of tyranny at Book IX's threshold and leaves the detailed account of the tyrant's inner happiness to the following book.

  31. BOOK IX.(第 1/2 部分)

    This section of Book IX of the Republic, a dialogue between Socrates and Adeimantus (with Glaucon taking up a reply), finishes the typology of the soul and state by examining the tyrannical man, arguing that he arises from the democratic man through unchecked appetites and a "master passion" modelled as a drone, and that the tyrant is the most unjust and most miserable of men. Socrates first sets out the unnecessary, lawless appetites that wake in sleep even in good men, then traces the tyrant's career: debts, theft, violence against parents, and eventual rule by a faction that makes him tyrant over his fatherland. Analogies to slaveholders and to a man carried off into the wilderness illustrate the tyrant's fear and servility. The chapter then assembles proofs of the ranking (king, timocrat, oligarch, democrat, tyrant), first by the criterion of virtue and happiness, then by the tripartite soul's three pleasures, with the philosopher's experience taken as the authoritative judge. The second half of the book, which resumes the argument about pleasure and the philosopher's life, is not covered here.

  32. BOOK IX.(第 2/2 部分)

    This section of Book IX, the second half of the chapter, takes up the ranking of the three kinds of life: the philosopher's, the honour-lover's, and the money-maker's. It argues that the philosopher alone has both experience of all three pleasures and the faculty of reason to judge them, so his verdict is the most trustworthy. It then distinguishes true pleasure from the mere cessation of pain, comparing pleasures to a grey-to-black contrast and comparing the sensual with the intellectual by degrees of being. The argument culminates in a myth of the many-headed beast, a lion and a man joined within one figure, used to show that justice is profitable because it subordinates the lower parts of the soul to the rational one. The chapter ends by describing the just man's self-regulated life and a city "laid up in heaven" as its pattern. It carries forward the refutation of Thrasymachus begun earlier and leaves the detailed city-constitutions to the preceding books.

  33. BOOK X.(第 1/2 部分)

    This section of Book X of Plato's Republic opens with Socrates praising the rejection of imitative poetry from the ideal State and explaining why, now that the parts of the soul have been distinguished, that exclusion looks even more justified. Through the bed-and-mirror analogy it establishes a three-tier structure: the form made by God, the particular bed made by the carpenter, and the painted image made by the imitator, who is thrice removed from truth and knows only appearances. It then tests Homer's claim to educate mankind, arguing that no city or private circle was ever improved by him, and concludes that imitative art appeals to the irrational part of the soul and nourishes emotions that reason should govern. The passage ends with a conditional invitation for poetry to defend itself, and it turns to the immortality of the soul, which is deferred to the following part of the book.

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